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Fire and Heat: 




Avicenna's analysis of the definition of substance and accident repeatedly emphasizes two points: one and 
the same essence cannot be substance in one instance and accident in another; whether x is extrinsic or 
intrinsic for an underlying y does not tell us anything as to whether x is substance or not. Both points are 
development in an argument against certain unnamed people who claimed the opposite. In this article I 
will show that Avicenna's opponents are to be identified with the mainstream Baghdad Peripatetic School 
(Ibn Suwār, Ibn al-Ṭayyib) which based itself on the Late Antique rule that "parts of substances are 
substances". As for Avicenna’s own position, it was developed on the basis of the heterodox position of 
Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī, who anticipated Avicenna’s first point. This is a further piece of evidence for something 
that has only recently begun to be appreciated: the influence of Ibn ʿAdī on Avicenna. 
 
In the introductory chapter I, 1 of his Kitāb al-Šifāʾ, al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt VI: Kitāb al-Nafs, Avicenna 
discusses the definition of soul. He examines the traditional Peripatetic approaches to defining 
the soul as a “power” (quwwa), “form” (ṣūra) or “perfection” (kamāl, i.e. entelecheia) of a body 
and concludes that “perfection” is the best of these.1 However – Avicenna continues – if we 
agree that soul is a perfection, this does not in itself provide grounds for straight-forwardly 
concluding that it is a “substance” (ǧawhar). For, after considering a variety of possibilities, 
Avicenna settles on the claim that, in order to be called a substance, soul must be “that which is 
not-in-a-subject at all” (mā laysa fī mawḍūʿ al-battata); and as long as we only know that the 
soul is a perfection, we are not able to conclude that it is “that which is not-in-a-subject at all”. 
Avicenna justifies this latter claim on the following grounds: 
  
If he means by “form”2 that which is not-in-a-subject at all (al-battata), i.e. that which does 
not exist at all (al-battata) [or] in any respect (bi-waǧh min al-wuǧūh) by subsisting in the 
thing which we called for you “subject”, then not every perfection would be substance. For 
many perfections are doubtless in-a-subject – (1) no matter if these many [perfections] are 
not-in-a-subject in relation to the composite (murakkab) and inasmuch as they are in it, 
because (2) their being a part of [the composite subject] does not prevent them from being 
in-a-subject, and (3) their being in it not as in-a-subject does not render them a substance – 
as some used to think.3 
 
In this passage, Avicenna explains why being a perfection does not necessarily entail being a 
substance. In (1), he grants that perfection is a part of the composite (murakkab). However, (2) 
its being a part of the composite (i.e. soul’s being a part of the human being) does not entail its 
being not-in-a-subject and (3) even if we accept that it is not in-a-subject in this particular case, it 
is still not automatically substance. In what follows this passage (l. 7-18), Avicenna concentrates 
on proving the last point. He reminds us that substance was defined as “being not-in-a-subject at 
                                                             
*I am grateful to Peter Adamson, Rotraud Hansberger and anonymous referee for their useful comments on this 
paper. 
1 Avicenna, Kitāb al-Šifāʾ, Al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt, al-Nafs, ed. F. RAHMAN, Avicenna’s De Anima, Being the Psychological 
Part of Kitāb al-Shifāʾ, (Oxford 1959), p. 7, l. 8-10. In the next passage Avicenna will argue that perfection is a 
better notion for the soul than „power“. 
2 „Form“ replaces here “substance” due to the context. 
3 Ibid., p. 9, l. 1-7. 
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all” and not just as “being not-in-a-subject”. He argues that the discovery that something is not-
in-a-subject in some particular case is not a sufficient ground for the conclusion that it is a 
substance. On the contrary, we have to investigate if this thing is not-in-a-subject in any case (lā 
fī šayʾ min ašyāʾ) in order to know whether it is a substance or not in this case. Even if, in a 
thousand different cases, something is not-in-a-subject, should we find out that it is in-a-subject 
in just one case, it has to be concluded that this thing as such or in its essence is an accident 
(ʿaraḍ fī nafsihī). For according to Avicenna being substance or accident does not apply to 
something in relation (bi-l-qiyās ilā) to a specific substrate, but rather it is an “expression” of its 
essence or “self” (bal huwa iʿtibār lahū fī ḏātihī).  
At the end of the general discussion of substance and accident in Nafs I, 1 Avicenna 
emphasizes that being a part of substance, i.e. being substantial (ǧawharī)4 is not the same as 
being substance (ǧawhar); and also that being not a part of substance, i.e. accidental (ʿaradī) is 
not the same as being accident (ʿaraḍ).5 Does this mean that there can be accidental substances 
and substantial accidents? As we will see, Avicenna gives an affirmative answer to this question. 
Avicenna then concludes by making one of his favorite cross-references to the Logic (al-Manṭiq) 
apparently of the Šifāʾ where the topic was discussed at length.  
Returning to the question of whether soul is substance Avicenna sums up the issue: the 
recognition that soul is a perfection only informs us that it is a part of a composite and at most 
that it is not-in-a-subject in this particular case, but it fails to resolve the question of whether soul 
is never in-a-subject. With this, Avicenna proves the comment that was the starting point of the 
passage, namely that from the fact that soul is a perfection of body we cannot conclude that it is 
a substance.6 
I started my paper with this passage not because I’m going to discuss the ontological 
status of the soul in Avicenna’s psychology,7 but rather because it reveals in brief some 
important problems concerning Avicenna’s definition of substance and accident. At first glance, 
Avicenna seems to define  substance in  traditional terms – “lā fī mawḍūʿ al-battata” stands 
obviously in a close relation to the Aristotelian “ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ οὐδενί ἐστιν“ (is not in any 
subject) that applies both to primary and to secondary substances (Cat. 1a22, 1b3). However, 
further investigation will reveal that there was some disagreement in the tradition regarding the 
definition of substance. Avicenna is arguing here against somebody who assumed (ẓanna 
baʿḍuhum) that everything that is a part of substance – even if it is a composite substance – is 
ipso facto to be assigned the status of substance. Avicenna’s own definition of substance which 
is provided in this passage places particular emphasis on the condition that a thing has to be 
                                                             
4 Both Arabic ǧawharī and English “substantial” are equivocal and can refer both to the fact that something is 
substance and that something is an integral ontological part of substance. In this article I will mean the latter 
whenever I use the word “substantial” or “substantiality”. To render the first idea I will use the expression 
“substancehood” or “being substance”. For the equivocity of Arabic “ǧawharī” see infra. 
5 Avicenna, Nafs I, 1, p. 10, l.3-6 
6 Ibid., p. 10, l. 9-14. 
7 Some research has already been done on Avicenna’s theory of the soul (e.g. DAG HASSE, Avicenna’s De Anima in 
the Latin West: The Formation of a Peripatetic Philosophy of the Soul, 1160-1300 (London-Turin 2000), THÉRÈSE-
ANNE DRUART, The Human Soul’s Individuation and Its Survival After The Body’s Death: Avicenna On The Causal 
Relation Between Body and Soul, in: Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 10 (2000), pp. 259-273). His famous “Flying 
Man” has attracted particular attention (e.g. MICHAEL MARMURA, Avicenna’s “Flying Man” in Context, in: M. 
MARMURA (ed.), Probing in Islamic Philosophy: Studies in the Philosophies of Ibn Sina, al-Ghazali and Other 
Major Thinkers (Bringhamton-New-York 2005), pp. 181-196). The question about the ontological status of the soul 
and its being a separable substance was investigated in ROBERT WISNOVSKY, Avicenna’s Metaphysics in Context 
(London 2003), pp. 113-144). 
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found in all cases to be “not-in-a-subject” in order to qualify as substance. In other words, being 
a substance or accident is thought of as an essential omnitemporal feature of each type of a thing.  
The above passage, then, presents some key features of the Avicennian definition of 
substance that will be central for the present paper. I intend to show that Avicenna’s position was 
a reaction against a majority view within the preceding philosophical tradition of defining 
substance. The most significant background of Avicenna’s discussion can be located in the 
dispute about the ontological status of heat (ḥarāra) in fire (nār) that emerged in the 1Oth century 
in the so-called Baghdad Peripatetic School. The key figures I shall discuss will be Yaḥyā Ibn 
ʿAdī (d. 974), Ḥasan Ibn Suwār (d. after 1017) and Abū l-Faraǧ Ibn al-Ṭayyib (d. 1043), the key 
question – does a part of a substance automatically attain the status of substance? Since this 
question had already been discussed at some length during Late Antiquity, we will also look at 
the roots of Yaḥyā’s and Ḥasan’s dispute on heat and fire in that epoch. It will be shown that in 
some respects Avicenna takes the position of Yaḥyā Ibn ʿAdī: both of them accept that 
something’s being a part of a composite does not render it a substance, whereas its being in-a-
subject even once does make it always an accident. In the Maqūlāt I, 6, Nafs I, 1 and Ilāhiyyāt II, 
1 Avicenna criticizes both sides of the discussion and the whole tradition preceding him on the 
topic of the general approach to the definition of substance and accidents. Avicenna argues that 
being a part of substance or not a part of substance, i.e. being substantial or accidental, has 
nothing to do with a thing’s being a substance or an accident. Neither Ibn ʿAdī nor Ibn Suwār 
would have agreed with this position. This last criticism makes Avicenna’s definition of 
substance and accident quite special. The significance of this is not to be underestimated. 
Avicenna’s interpretation of the Aristotelian definition of substance allows him to distinguish 
between what one would call nowadays “essential” and “existential” grounding. Moreover, it 
bears on the traditional questions of natural philosophy and metaphysics. In particular, the 
passage from Nafs I, 1 discussed above clearly shows that the Avicennan definition of substance 
is crucial for his philosophical methodology.  
 
 Parts of Substances are Substances: Antique and Late Antique Context 
 
In our search for the roots of Avicenna’s discussion of the definition of substance we will have to 
go back some distance in the history of philosophy. The starting point of the development of 
what was later to become Avicenna’s definition of substance is undoubtedly Aristotle’s 
Categories.  
 In Cat., Aristotle defines both primary and secondary substances as things “which are 
not-in-a-subject” (κοινὸν δὲ κατὰ πάσης οὐσίας τὸ μὴ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ εἶναι – Cat. 3a7) or rather 
“not-in-a-subject at all” (ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ οὐδενί ἐστιν – Cat. 1a22, 1b3). Accidents, for their 
part, are in-a-subject. Being in-a-subject is articulated by Aristotle in the following manner: “By 
being ‘present in-a-subject’ I mean what is present not as a part in a whole, but being incapable 
of existence apart from the said subject” (ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ λέγω ὃ ἔν τινι μὴ ὡς μέρος ὑπάρχον 
ἀδύνατον χωρὶς εἶναι τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἐστίν – Cat. 1a24-25, tr. based on Barnes).8 It follows that if 
something is in its subject as a part of a composite, it is not-in-a-subject par excellence, i.e. as 
                                                             
8 I cannot agree with FRANS DE HAAS, John Philoponus’ New Definition of Prime Matter (Leiden-New-York-Köln 
1997), p. 198 that this definition should not be understood as a definition of accident. Indeed, using Avicenna’s 
framework, it is the definition of accident as an ontological category but not the definition of “accidentality” 
(meaning “being extrinsic”).  
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accidents are. Does this mean that something that is a part of a composite is automatically a 
substance? Aristotle seems to give an affirmative answer: “The fact that the parts of substances 
appear to be present in the whole, as in-a-subject, should not make us apprehensive, lest we 
should have to admit that such parts are not substances: for in explaining the phrase ‘being 
present in-a-subject', we stated that we meant ‘otherwise than as parts in a whole’” (tr. Barnes).9 
Does this apply only to organic parts of physical bodies or also to matter and form as parts of the 
hylomorphyic compound?10 If one opts for the latter and believes that differentiae are in some 
sense forms one could conclude that differentiae are substances (as Alexander of Aphrodisias 
did).11 Aristotle touches upon this conclusion at Cat. 3a21. He assumes there that being not-in-a-
subject is not a proprium of substances because it also applies to differentiae.12 One can draw a 
twofold conclusion from this passage: on the one hand, differentia is said to be not-in-a-subject – 
so we can seemingly conclude that it is substance. On the other hand, Aristotle explicitly 
contrasts differentiae to substances since he explains that being not-in-a-subject is not a 
proprium of either substance or differentia. Thus, Aristotle leaves unanswered the question as to 
whether we can automatically label conceptual parts of substances as substances: the case of 
differentiae (if they count as parts of substances) is highly ambiguous. 
 One of the first reactions to Aristotle’s account of substance in Cat. that is known to us is 
found in Simplicius’ report concerning a mysterious Lucius.13 Lucius’ aporia – reported by 
Simplicius - reveals that there was an interpretation of Aristotle’s account of substance in the 
Categories during Antiquity that ascribed to him a view that some parts of substance – at least 
intelligible ones – are in their substance as in-a-subject and so ipso facto are not themselves 
substances. Lucius – according to Simplicius – pointed out that the “complements” of substance 
(τὰ συμπληρωτικὰ τῆς οὐσίας) should be thought of as parts of substance – for example, the 
whiteness and coldness that are parts of the substance of snow. If we accept Aristotle’s definition 
of that which is not-in-a-subject, which allows parts of substances not to be in-a-subject, then 
two possibilities follow necessarily. Either (1) these complements are not-in-a-subject, in which 
case complements are substances; or (2) the definition of accidenthood is false and the condition 
“they are not parts of a subject” has to be omitted from it.14 Since Lucius concludes that Aristotle 
must opt for the second possibility, he thinks that Aristotle would not agree with the first one.15 
                                                             
9 Aristotle, Categoriae, ed. L. MINIO PALUELLO, Aristotelis categoriae et liber de interpretatione (Oxford 1949), 
3a29-32: “μὴ ταραττέτω δὲ ἡμᾶς τὰ μέρη τῶν οὐσιῶν ὡς ἐν ὑποκειμένοις ὄντα τοῖς ὅλοις, μή ποτε ἀναγκασθῶμεν οὐκ 
οὐσίας αὐτὰ φάσκειν εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ οὕτω τὰ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐλέγετο τὰ ὡς μέρη ὑπάρχοντα ἔν τινι.” 
10 Most modern interpreters assume that Aristotle meant physical parts and not differentiae in this passage (s. e.g. 
KLAUS OEHLER, Aristoteles: Werke in deutscher Übersetzung, Bd. 1 (Oldenburg 2006), p. 265 and MARWAN 
RASHED, Essentialisme: Alexandre d’Aphrodise entre logique, physique et cosmologie (Berlin-New York 2007), p. 
43, n. 133). However, the Late Antique commentators wouldn’t have agreed with this interpretation, as will become 
clear shortly. For the view that it is hylomorphic compound here at stake s. RASHED, Essentialisme, p. 44.  
11 Cf. RASHED, Essentialisme, p. 50, 69-70, 75ff. This can be also related to comparing dfferentiae-genus relation to 
form-matter relation (cf. Aristotle, Met. Δ, 28, 1024b6-9 and Met. Z, 12, 1038a-9 and Porphyry, Isagoge, ed. A. 
BUSSE, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 4.1. (Berlin 1887), p. 11, 15-6). 
12 Cat. 3a20-22: „ὥστε οὐκ ἂν εἴη οὐσία τῶν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ. —οὐκ ἴδιον δὲ οὐσίας τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ διαφορὰ τῶν μὴ 
ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν.“ 
13 On Lucius and the aporia handed down by Simplicius s. MICHAEL GRIFFIN, Aristotle’s Categories in the Early 
Roman Empire (Oxford 2015), pp. 108-11; 120-1 und PAUL MORAUX, Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen: von 
Andronikos bis Alexander von Aphrodisias, Bd. 2 (Berlin-New-York 1984), p. 528-563 esp. 537-538. 
14Simplicius, In Aristotelis categorias commentarium, ed. K. KALBFLEISCH, Simplicii in Aristotelis categorias 
commentarium, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 8 (Berlin 1907), p. 48, 1-11. 
15  P. Moraux rightly noticed this aporia is rather strange against the background of what we find in Aristotle’s Cat. 
It is Aristotle himself who firstly accepts that differentiae – that undoubtedly are to be numbered under Lucius’ 
“complements” of substance – are not-in-a-subject. Moreover, he agrees at Cat. 3a29-32 that the parts of a substance 
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Hence, in Lucius’ opinion Aristotle cannot agree that the aforementioned complements of 
substances are not-in-a-subject. For “whiteness” and “coldness” are qualities and therefore are 
good candidates for being accidents. 
 Following Lucius’ aporia Simplicius provides an answer given by Porphyry16 where he 
quotes Porphyry’s “In Cat. ad Gedalium”. Porphyry explicitly states there that the 
“complements” of substance are in their substance but not as in-a-subject – i.e. he chooses the 
first possibility offered by Lucius. The famous example of heat and fire comes to the forefront 
here: heat is in fire (ἡ θερμότης τῆς μὲν τοῦ πυρὸς) essentially (οὐσιωδῶς) and not as in-a-subject 
because it is its complement whereas in iron it is as in-a-subject.17 Porphyry makes an important 
shift when proving that complements are not in-a-subject. He argues that only accidents that 
come to be and depart from their subject (γίνεται καὶ ἀπογίνεται ἐν τῷ σιδήρῳ ἄνευ τῆς τοῦ 
σιδήρου φθορᾶς) are in it.18 In order to distinguish what is in-a-subject from what is not, 
Porphyry draws the main contrast between “substantial” and “accidental”. The former is not-in-
a-subject, the latter is.19 However, Porphyry still does not accept that everything that is 
substantial qualifies as substance. In his system, (1) what is in-a-subject is accident whereas (2) 
what is not-in-a-subject can be divided into (2a) substance and (2b) the complements of 
substance. If this is the case, then Porphyry introduces a third kind of entity alongside substances 
and accidents: “substantial complements”. Simplicius seems to grasp this difficulty in his 
reaction to Porphyry’s opinion, although from the way he expresses himself it seems that he did 
not understand the argument.20 We shall come back to Simplicius’ solution to this problem later. 
 In In Cat., Porphyry discusses the Aristotelian passage at Cat. 3a21 where differentiae are 
said to have ‘being not-in-a-subject’ in common with substances. Here again, Porphyry argues 
that complements of substance are in their substances not as in-a-subject. However, his position 
retains the tension in the Aristotelian account at Cat. 3a21. On the one hand, Porphyry accepts 
the contrast between substances and differentiae. He further claims that differentiae are not 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
are substances themselves and correspondingly not-in-a-subject exactly because of his definition stated above in Cat 
(MORAUX, Aristotelismus, p. 538). 
16 Despite Simplicius’ account it remains a question whether Porphyry really was the first to try to solve Lucius’ 
aporia. For instance, it is known that both Alexander of Aphrodisias and Plotinus agreed with a view identical with 
the first possibility given by Lucius. They could have anticipated Porphyry in this respect (RASHED, Essentialisme, 
p. 76ff on Alexander defining differentiae as substances and Plotinus, Enneades, ed. P. HENRY and H.R. SCHWYZER, 
Plotini opera, vol. 2 (Berlin 1959): VII, 3, 5, 12-13 where Plotinus draws on substancehood on the ground of being 
a part of substance). 
17 A possible source for this line of thought could have been Alexander’s view that heat is substance as an intrinsic 
element of substances (Alexander apud Averroem, In Aristotelis metaphysica commentarium, in: Averroes, Tafsīr 
mā baʿd al-ṭabīʿa: Grande Commentaire de la Métaphysique, ed. M. BOUYGES (Beirut 1938-1948), p. 1519, 10-11). 
In Alexander, In Aristotelis topicorum libros octo commentaria, ed. M. WALLIES, Commentaria in Aristotelem 
Graeca 2.2. (Berlin 1891), p. 50, 14-15 Alexander claims that heat is not an accident of fire though it is an accident 
in other things. Thereby he rejects the suggested definition of accident as that “which is accidental at least once”. 
Though this looks very similar to Avicenna’s definition, there is a radical difference between them. Alexander’s 
opponents applies this definition to the accident meaning “accidental” whereas Avicenna to “accident as ontological 
category”. Therefore Avicenna’s position is rather closer to Alexander: that something can be both accidental and 
substantial in different cases. Cf. THEODOR ERBERT, Aristotelian Accidents, in: C. Taylor (ed.), Oxford Studies in 
Ancient Philosophy XVI (1998), p. 146-147 and DE HAAS, Prime Matter, p. 203.  
18 Porphyry applies Aristotle’s second definition of accident in Top I, 5, 102b6-7, upgraded by Alexander, In Top., 
p. 49, 25 – 50, 5 to accident defined as being-in-a-subject. 
19 Simplicius, In Cat., p. 48, 11-33. 
20 Ibid., 49, 1-9. Simplicius objects to Porphyry as follows. If „ being not-in-a-subject“ is predicated only of 
substances whereas “being in-a-substance” is predicated of accidents, then “complements” seem to belong to no 
category at all. Since Simplicius automatically equates being not-in-a-subject with substance he does not notice 
Porphyry’s insistence that the substantial complements are precisely not-in-a-subject parallel to substances, so that 
being not-in-a-subject is characteristic of both. 
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substances according to the Aristotelian notion, but are rather just “substantial qualities” (ποιότης 
οὐσιώδης). That is, as might have been expected, he refuses to count differentiae as  secondary 
substances. For, apparently, he concedes the hidden premise of Lucius’ aporia that qualities are 
not substances.21 On the other hand, immediately in the next passage, Porphyry writes that 
differentiae are complements of substance and adds that the complements of substance are 
substances (τὰ συμπληρωτικὰ δὲ τῶν οὐσιῶν οὐσίαι).22 As S. Strange correctly points out, 
Porphyry seems to be alluding here to Cat. 3a29.23 The first premise would be that the 
complements of substance are parts of substances; the second premise – that the parts of 
substances are substances (as at Cat. 3a29); the conclusion – that the complements of substances 
are substances. Again, it is not quite clear whether Porphyry makes the step that concludes that 
differentiae are substances, but his analysis provides some grounds for this interpretation.24 Still, 
the text as it stands seems rather to indicate a self-contradiction: differentiae are both “substantial 
qualities” and substances. This contradiction was to be removed in the later tradition, which 
opted for the second possibility alone. 
It is important for the purposes of our later discussion to note Porphyry’s emphasis, in 
this passage, that something’s being an accident can be inferred from its being accidental. The 
substantial is contrasted to it as regards being not-in-a-subject. Heat for example can be removed 
from water without destroying its substance (ἀρθείσης γὰρ τῆς θερμότητος οὐ φθείρεται), so it is 
accidental for it. On the other hand, heat is substantial for fire because its removal does destroy 
fire’s substance (ἀρθεῖσα γὰρ φθείρει τὸ πῦρ). Since Porphyry seeks to prove in this passage that 
differentiae are not-in-a-subject, the following theory can be reconstructed: if something is 
substantial it is not-in-a-subject, whereas if something is accidental, it is in-a-subject. Thus, 
Porphyry made a very, if not the most, important step towards the position that Avicenna would 
later come to attack. He introduced accidentality (i.e. extrinsicality) as a criterion for being in-a-
subject or not. Only one step remains in the development of this line of thought: to remove the 
aforementioned contradiction by eliminating any contrast between differentiae and substances 
that can be suggested on  grounds of Cat. 3a21. 
  This is exactly what later Neoplatonist Commentators would do. Simplicius reacts 
against Porphyry’s solution to Lucius’ aporia and brings to its natural end what Porphyry began 
in the second section of the discussed passage from In Cat.  Simplicius states that if parts of 
substances are substances, and complements - including differentiae – are parts of substances, we 
can conclude that differentiae of substances are substances – as noted earlier it was already 
Alexander who came to this conclusion.25  
Ammonius takes up his predecessors’ idea that differentiae have an indefinite status. In 
the case of heat in fire, we are dealing with something between substance and accident (ἀκριβῶς 
ἐν μέσῳ τῶν οὐσιῶν καὶ τῶν συμβεβηκότων), whereas such differentiae as “rational” and 
                                                             
21 Porphyry, In Aristotelis categorias commentarium, ed. A. BUSSE, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 4.1. (Berlin 
1887), p. 95, 17 – 20. In the same direction goes Porphyry’s famous differentiation between genera and differentiae 
regarding the fact that the former are ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορούμενον whereas the latter ἐν τῷ ποῖόν τί ἐστι 
κατηγορούμενον (Idem, Isagoge, p. 2, 16; 11, 7-8). 
22 Porphyry, In Cat., 95, 22 – 96, 2. 
23 Porphyry, On Aristotle’s Categories, tr. S. STRANGE (London 1992), p. 87, n. 199. 
24 Indeed, the sentence „διὸ καὶ εἰς τὸν ὁρισμὸν τῆς οὐσίας παραλαμβάνεται ἡ διαφορὰ ὡς συμπληρωτικὴ οὖσα τῆς 
οὐσίας“ can be interpreted in this way, especially because the assumption that complements are substances is 
connected to it by a „ δὲ“. However one should avoid leaping to conclusions. For one can also suggest that Porphyry 
is just explaining here why differentiae are parts of the definition of substances next to genera. 
25 Simplicius, In Cat., p. 49, 1-9. 
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“mortal” are related to the substance (πρὸς τῇ οὐσίᾳ).26 Ammonius’ own approach to the solution 
of the problem is somewhat less messy than this, and anticipates that of Simplicius. Differentiae 
are parts of substance; they constitute it (συνιστᾶσιν). Aristotle says clearly that parts of 
substance are substances themselves. Ammonius emphasizes that Aristotle did not mean only 
physical parts at Cat. 3a29 but intelligible parts too and, among them, differentiae.27 As for Cat. 
3a21, he solves the problem by saying that Aristotle is only contrasting sensible substances and 
differentiae, not substances and differentiae in general.28 The conclusion is simple and 
perspicuous: “Differentiae are substances in the strict sense” (αἵτινές εἰσι κυρίως οὐσίαι).29 
Philoponus and Elias follow Ammonius in their Commentaries on Cat. 3a21, and acknowledge 
differentiae to be substances on the same grounds.30 
With that, we have finished retracing the development of the definition of substance as 
applied to the case of substances’ parts. We started with Aristotle’s twofold assumption: (1) that 
being in-a-subject excludes being a part of a composite, so that the parts of substances are not-in-
a-subject; (2) that differentiae are not-in-a-subject. In the course of time, the Late Antique 
commentators on Aristotle developed Aristotle’s account. If something is substantial, i.e. an 
intrinsic metaphysical part of a substance, it is substance itself – maybe because it is a form in 
this case, as Alexander claimed. If it is accidental it is an accident. Whether something is a 
substance or accident is to be inferred on the grounds of its current relation to that which it is 
predicated of. Thus, all the “complements” of substance, including differentiae, are substances 
because they are parts of substances. This fact suffices for inferring their being substance.31 
 
 
 Yaḥyā Ibn ʿAdī and Ibn Suwār on fire and heat 
 
The problem of the ontological status of the parts of substances emerges again in the writings of 
Yaḥyā Ibn ʿAdī. It is not quite clear why he came to speak about this problem.32 The work most 
                                                             
26 Ammonius, In Aristotelis categorias commentarius, ed. A. BUSSE, Ammonius in Aristotelis categorias 
commentaries, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 4.4. (Berlin 1895), p. 46, 10-20. Two points are not quite clear 
about this report. Firstly, Ammonius probably means Porphyry’s account of differentiae when he speaks of a 
“middle” position. Elias supports this view (Eliae (olim Davidis) in Aristotelis categorias commentarium, ed. A. 
BUSSE, Eliae in Porphyrii isagogen et Aristotelis categorias commentaria, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 
18.1. (Berlin 1900), p. 173, 13ff). However, J. Dillon remarks in his translation of Dexippus’ commentary on the 
Categories (transl. Dillon, p. 89, n. 50) that the “middle” position (that is also mentioned there) is rather to be 
ascribed to Plotinus. Secondly, it is not clear enough whether “related to substance” just means “substance”. The 
opposed case, when differentiae are “related to accidents” (πρὸς τοῖς συμβεβηκόσι), which is also mentioned by 
Ammonius, supports this suggestion. Ammonius gives an example of “white” in swan as a differentia “related to 
accident”. However, it is commonly known that “white” is just an accident of swan (although inseparable). Thus, 
one can conclude, even with this report, that for Porphyry some differentiae such as “rational” and “mortal” are 
substances. 
27 Ammonius, In Cat., p. 46, 20 – 47, 5 
28 Ibid., p. 45, 17 – 46, 9. 
29 Ibid., 47, 9. 
30 John Philoponus, In Aristotelis categorias commentarium, ed. A. BUSSE, Philoponi (olim Ammonii) in Aristotelis 
categorias commentarium, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 13.1. (Berlin 1898), p. 64, 9-69,11 and Elias, In 
Cat., p. 172, 31-174,23. 
31 This approach could have been helpful in the Commentators’ project of reconciling Plato and Aristotle. For 
secondary substances become more ontologically independent in this system. On this s. infra in the conclusion of 
this article. Alexander obviously had different reasons for which see RASHED, Essentialisme, pp. 24-5. 
32 G. Endress suggested that it could have been the need to defend his Trinitarian doctrine that pushed Ibn ʿAdī 
towards discussing the topic (ENDRESS The Works of Yaḥyā Ibn ʿAdī: An Analytical Inventory (Wiesbaden, 1977), p. 
49). This suggestion does not seem to be quite convincing. On the one hand, Ibn ʿAdī’s try to prove that heat is not a 
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informative of his position on the issue in question is the forthcoming “On Fire and Heat”.33 In 
this treatise, Ibn ʿAdī discusses at length why heat’s (ḥarāra) being a part of the definition of fire 
(nār) does not make it a substance (ǧawhar). While discussing this problem, Ibn ʿAdī reveals his 
understanding of the definition of substance and accident. 
 Ibn ʿAdī’s opponents argue as follows:  
 
1. Anything that cannot be removed from a substance in the imagination is its substantial 
part  
2. If something is a part of a substance, it is a substance itself  
3. Heat cannot be removed from the substance of fire in the imagination 
4. Thus, heat is a part of the substance of fire [from 1, 3]  
5. Thus, heat is a substance itself [from 2, 4]34  
 
To this, Ibn ʿAdī reacts: “[Their saying] that everything that removes substance while being 
imagined as removed is a part of substance and substance as well – since the parts of substance 
are substances – this is a true premise (inna kull mā yarfaʿu bi-tawahhumihī35 murtafiʿan 
ǧawharan fa-huwa ǧuzʾ ǧawhar wa-ǧawhar ayḍan iḏā kānat aǧzāʾ al-ǧawhar ǧawāhir fa-inna 
hāḏihī l-muqaddima ṣādiqa).”36 It is clear that both Ibn ʿAdī and his opponents follow 
Porphyry’s rule that everything intrinsic to a substance, i.e. substantial, is a substance. Ibn ʿAdī 
relies again on Porphyry’s authority when he defines accident: “accident is that which comes to 
be and vanishes without its bearer being destroyed (al-ʿaraḍ huwa mā yakūnu wa-yabṭulu min 
ġayr fasād ḥāmilihī).”37 It is important to remember here that in the Categories’ definition of 
being in-a-subject, not the accident but the subject had to vanish in order that what is in-a-subject 
vanishes too (ἀδύνατον χωρὶς εἶναι τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἐστίν): 
 (D1) Cat.: if substance is removed, what is in it as in-a-subject has to be removed too. 
 (D2) Porphyry: if accident is removed, substance does not have to be removed too. 
Although these two definitions are compatible, one notes that Porphyry shifted the focus of the 
test from the substance onto the accident and Ibn ʿAdī follows him in this respect.38 
 If Ibn ʿAdī agrees with his opponents and the Porphyrian tradition that parts of substances 
are substances and that being accidental/substantial suffices to infer thing’s being substance or 
accident, how can he disagree that heat is a substance within the substance of fire? Ibn ʿAdī’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
substance in fire could be considered as a way to help him show that the Son in not a substance in God. However, 
since Ibn ʿAdī proves in “On Heat and Fire” that heat is in fire as an accident, it is highly implausible that he would 
parallel it to the Logos being in the Father. 
33 The first to attract attention to this treatise and point out that it is combined with the Late Antique discussions on 
the ontological status of the parts of substance was G. ENDRESS in The Works, p. 49. Then, R. Wisnovsky found a 
manuscript of the treatise (ROBERT WISNOVSKY, New Philosophical Texts of Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī: A Supplement to 
Endress’ Analytical Inventory, in: F. OPWIS and D. REISMAN, Islamic Philosophy, Science, Culture, and Religion: 
Studies in Honor of Dimitri Gutas (Leiden-Boston 2012), p. 313). I am grateful to R. Hansberger and R. Wisnovsky 
for providing me access to the draft of the edition of this MS. The following references will be to its folios and 
paragraphs as presented in the Hansberger-Wisnovsky forthcoming edition.  
34 Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī, On Fire and Heat, fol. 18r, §5. 
35 tawahhum stays in Arabic for ἐπίνοια in Greek cf. Porphyry, Isagoge, p. 13,1-2 and its translation in Manṭiq 
Arisṭū, ed. ʿA. BADAWĪ (Beirut 1980), p. 1086. I render it with “imagining” in order to keep the idea of thought 
experiment but I do not mean any sense of φαντασία implied here. 
36 Ibid., §10. 
37 Ibid., §13. 
38 For instance something can be an accident in Porphyrian sense and still a not-in-a-subject in Aristotelian sense – 
the possibility which Avicenna will cash out, s. infra.  
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answer is simple – fire is not a substance and subsequently heat cannot be labeled as 
“substantial” for fire and thereby itself be called “substance”. He reminds us of the definition of 
fire: “simple hot dry body (ǧism basīṭ ḥārr yābis)”. Ibn ʿAdī classifies fire as a “composition” 
(muǧtamiʿa) of substance and accidents, where the substance is “body” (ǧism) and heat and 
dryness are accidents.39 It is not fire that is the bearer (ḥāmil) of heat but exactly this “body”.40 
On these grounds Ibn ʿAdī is able to reconcile his claim that heat is not a substance in fire with 
Porphyrian notions of substantiality and accidentality. So although the removing of heat removes 
also fire we cannot say that it is substantial for fire because fire is neither a substance itself nor is 
it a subject (mawḍūʿ) for heat. As for the “body” of fire, it is both substance and a subject for 
heat, but heat is not substantial for it and can be removed without this “body” being destroyed. 
Thus, heat is accidental for the “body” of fire although it is an integral part of fire as a whole. In 
this case nothing prevents heat’s being an accident since it is something accidental for the 
substance that underlies it, i.e. the “body” of fire.41 
 This solution seems to be rather ad hoc. One could possibly ask Ibn ʿAdī, how is he going 
to discern between the mentioned “compositions” and true substances? Why should not we 
suggest that “man” is also just a composition of the substance “living being” with the accident 
“rationality”? Parallel to Ibn ʿAdī’s analysis of fire, it is possible to take not “man” to be the 
“bearer” or subject for “rationality” but rather the “living being” that is also a part of his 
substance. As for the “living being” which is its true “bearer”, “rationality” is accidental for it. 
Thus, one could conclude that rationality is also an accident in “man”. Claiming that fire is an 
accident for the body of fire and not for the fire itself is not a solution. For the same can be said 
for every differentia, namely, that it always is accidental for its genus, in which case Ibn ʿAdī 
faces a danger that all differentiae are accidents. However, the described analysis of fire and heat 
is not the only argument for heat’s being an accident that Ibn ʿAdī produces in his treatise. 
Rather it is not a self-standing argument at all.42 What Ibn ʿAdī seeks to prove is the fact that 
heat’s inalienability from fire does not prevent its being an accident. However, it is because of 
heat’s being an accident that we infer that fire is not a substance and not vice versa. 
 The true argument relies, not on Porphyrian notions of substantiality and accidentality, 
but rather on Ibn ʿAdī’s own understanding of the Categories’ account of substance and 
accident.43 One finds full definitions of substances and accidents that are based on the 
Aristotelian account of substance and accident in the Categories. Accident is defined as “that 
                                                             
39 Ibid., §11. In another philosophical treatise, Ibn ʿAdī again points out that fire as an element is “a collection of 
predicables” (ǧumla muʾallafa min maqūlāt) but  adds that it can also be understood as a substance (ǧawhar) (s. 
Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī, Maqālāt Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī al-falsafiyya, ed. S. ḪALĪFĀT (Amman1988), p. 190). Unfortunately, he does 
not explain what these cases are. It is obvious that our case in “On Fire and Heat” deals with fire as with an element 
that is not a substance but rather a “collection”. 
40 Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī, On Fire and Heat, fol. 18r, §14-16. 
41 Comparing this to Ibn ʿAdī’s famous tripartite system ontological levels ((1) essence qua universal, (2) essence 
qua essence, (3) essence qua particular, s. MARWAN RASHED, Ibn ʿAdī et Avicenne: sur les types d’existants, in: R. 
CHIARADONNA (ed.), Aristotele e suoi esegeti neoplatonici: logica e ontolgia nelle interpretazioni greche e arabe 
(Bibliopolis, 2004), pp. 107 – 172) one can suggest that only (2) are substances properly speaking and other two are 
composites of substance and accidents. 
42 This is obviously so in the first part of the treatise. However, Ibn ʿAdī comes back to this argument later in 
support of his second argument and there it seems to function still as an argument (s. Ibid., fol. 19r, §36). 
43 Ibn ʿAdī shows that this is his preferred argument when he mentions only it in his discussion in the presence of 
the vizier Abū l-Qasīm ʿĪsā Ibn ʿAlī Ibn ʿĪsā al-Ǧarrāḥ (s. short treatise Yaḫyā b. ʿAdī, Nusḫat mā aṯbatahū Yaḥyā b. 
ʿAdī li-Abī Bakr al-Adamī al-ʿAṭṭār, fol. 72v in Hansberger-Wisnovsky edition). Ibn ʿAdī claims there that the genus 
of heat – if it were substance – would not include the heat in iron where it is an accident. This argument obviously 
functions in the same way as the argument to be presented. 
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which exists in a thing not as its part so that its subsistence is impossible without the thing in 
which it is (al-mawǧūd fī šayʾ lā ka-ǧuzʿ minhu wa-laysa yumkinu an yakūna qiwāmuhū ġayr al-
laḏī huwa fīhi)”. Substance is “that which is not in any subject at all (mā laysa huwa l-battata fī 
mawḍūʿ mā)”.44 As for the previous analysis, i.e. the Porphyrian approach to the establishing of 
substantiality and accidentality, it relied mostly on the “lā ka-ǧuzʾ minhū” part of this definition. 
However, the author of “On Fire and Heat” emphasizes on the part of the Aristotelian definition 
of substance that says that substance is not in any subject at all (al-battata fī mawḍūʿ mā).45 Ibn 
ʿAdī clearly understands this not only as “in any respect” but “in no possible case”. Substance, 
he says, has to be not in any subject whatsoever (fī mawḍūʿ min al-mawḍūʿāt al-battata).46 On 
these grounds, Ibn ʿAdī comes to the main claim of his treatise: one and the same entity that is 
described with the same definition cannot be both accident and substance (ġayr mumkin an 
yakūna maʿnā wāḥid  - wa huwa mā yuḥaddu bi-ḥadd wāḥid - ʿaraḍan wa-ǧawharan).47 This 
claim is supported by the principle of non-contradiction: it is not possible for opposites to be true 
at the same time (anna l-mutanāqiḍayn lā yumkinu an yaṣḍiqā maʿan).48 Why should we think 
that the “at the same time” is applicable to our case? 49 For in every possible case we will deal 
with one and the same entity (maʿnā) or essence (ḏāt)50 – with something that is described by 
one and the same definition. Since it is well known that heat can be an accident in some cases, 
e.g. in iron (ḥadīd)51, and two opposite characteristics cannot be true of one and the same entity, 
it entails that heat – as an entity – is an accident in its essence and subsequently in the case of 
fire. 
 Although this argument is essentially new in the tradition it has not pushed Yaḥyā Ibn 
ʿAdī to retreat from the Porphyrian analysis of substantiality and accidentality. He concludes 
with the claim that the impossibility of “accidental substances” and “substantial accidents” 
follows from Aristotle’s doctrine (rafaḍa arisṭūṭālis min al-qisma iǧāb ǧawhar ʿaraḍī aw ʿaraḍ 
ǧawharī).52 Unfortunately, Ibn ʿAdī breaks off his analysis of this point in this passage. 
However, if one combines his first semi-argument and the second argument from non-
contradiction, it becomes clear how Ibn ʿAdī comes to his conclusion. It is simple in the case of 
the impossibility of accidental substances: if something is ever found to be accidental, it is 
always considered as an accident according to the Porphyrian system. The case of substantial 
accidents is more complex: if something is ever found to be in-a-subject, it has to be concluded 
                                                             
44I am not aware of any earlier account of substance and accidents that would anticipate Ibn ʿAdī’s. The closest is 
the suggestion that Alexander refutes in In Top., p.50, 12-13. In the modern scholarship, one finds a very similar 
interpretation of the Aristotelian account of accidents in EBERT, Aristotelian Accidents, pp. 143-147. 
45 Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī, On Fire and Heat, fol. 18v, §27. 
46 Ibid., § 22. 
47 Ibid., fol. 18v, §26; or later: “maḥāl an yūǧada maʿnā wāḥid bi-ʿaynihī ǧawharan li-šayʾ mā wa-ʿaraḍan li-šay  ʾ
aḫar” (Ibid., 19v, §52). 
48 Ibid., fol. 18v, §28. 
49 Ibn ʿAdī spends a lot of time proving the applicability of this rule to the substance/accident case. E.g. he has to 
prove that the suggestion that there is something like a universal (kullī) “heat” that can be once accident and once 
substance does not entail the possibility for heat to be once accident and once substance (Ibid., fol. 19r, §32ff). 
Unfortunately, his argumentation is very subtle and long and we have to omit it for the sake of brevity.  
50 Ibid., fo. 18v, §23: “fa-laysa mumkin iḏān an yaṣdiqa fī ḏāt wāḥida aʿnī mā yadillu ʿalayhi ḥadd wāḥid annahū fī 
mawḍuʿ wa-annahū lā fī mawḍūʿ”. 
51 Notice the use of the same example the Porphyrian tradition used to illustrate when heat is not something 
substantial but accidental.  
52 Ibid., fol. 18v, §24. Though Porphyry himself accepted substantial accidents because he had a middle way 
between substances and accidents. However later tradition led his analysis towards its logical end where no 
substantial accidents were possible any more (unless in different respects). “Substantial accidents” should not be 
confused with Aristotelian “essential accidents” (συμβεβηκότα καθ’αὑτά, s. Met. Δ, 30, 1025a30-34.). 
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that that thing, in its essence, is an accident. However, it is possible that in some particular case it 
happens to be an integral part of some composite entity (i.e. it cannot be removed without this 
entity being destroyed). In this case, it has to be concluded that this entity is not a substance – 
otherwise there would be something substantial that is an accident. 
 Thus Ibn ʿAdī has managed to combine the traditional Porphyrian approach to discerning 
substance and accident with his own idea, that being a substance or accident is something 
essential for an entity. He remains faithful to Porphyrian notions when he infers a thing’s being 
an accident on grounds of it being accidental. This is how one establishes that heat is an accident 
in the case of iron. However, inalienability no longer suffices to conclude that something is a 
substance. Since being a substance or an accident is something essential for, say, some x, we 
must first investigate whether x has ever been an accident. If not, we can suggest that x is a 
substance qua being a substantial part of another substance (as in the case of “rationality” and 
“man”). However, if it was once accidental and an accident, we must conclude that it is also now 
an accident, being an inalienable part of the “composite” which is a combination of substance 
and accidents. This is how Ibn ʿAdī’s theory as it is found in his “On Fire and Heat” works. As 
we are about to see, it leads to a metaphysical problem that was noticed by Ibn ʿAdī’s opponents. 
 It is unknown what the positions of Ibn ʿAdī’s contemporary opponents and supporters 
were.53 However, his disciple Ḥasan b. Suwār b. Ḫammār wrote a whole treatise against his 
teacher on this topic. Although the treatise is lost, some of its arguments are preserved in 
margine of MS: Paris Biliothèque nationale, ar. 2346 of Categories.54 This commentary shows 
that Ibn Suwār tried to retreat to the Porphyrian notions of substantiality/being substance and 
accidentality/being accident. In order to do this, he first once again emphasized the part of the 
definition of being in-a-subject that says that it is “not as a part of a subject”. Secondly, he tried 
to eliminate Ibn ʿAdī’s interpretation of “not in any subject at all” by suggesting a different 
linguistic reading. 
Ibn Suwār’s main goal is to prove that Ibn ʿAdī’s theory that substance has to be always 
substance, i.e. never in-a-subject (innahū laysa huwa fī šayʾ min al-mawḍūʿāt al-battata), is 
false.55 His first step is the argument that in this case all the differentiae (fuṣūl) would be 
accidents because they all are necessarily accidental to genera. Moreover, everything except 
prime matter would be an accident; for only prime matter is never in-a-subject.56 Since 
everything is actually accidental to at least prime matter, and since for Ibn ʿAdī nothing can be a 
“substantial accident” or an “accidental substance” at the same time it follows that there are no 
substances apart from prime matter. So everything that exists is a composite of prime matter and 
accidents, which Ibn Suwār assumes to be absurd. 
Ibn Suwār’s other mode of argumentation is mostly based on authorities. In order to 
support his position that parts of substances are inevitably substances – even if they are accidents 
in some  cases – he cannot help but mention that Ibn ʿAdī’s opinion finds no support among the 
Commentators (al-mufassirūn), nor in general among any Ancients (aḥad min al-mutaqaddimīn) 
                                                             
53 Apart from Abū Bakr al-Adamī al-ʿAṭṭar, who is mentioned in a short treatise on this topic (Ibn ʿAdī, Nusḫa), Ibn 
Suwār mentions also Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm Ibn Bakkūš as Ibn ʿAdī’s rival and Abū Sulaymān Muḥammad b. Ṭāhir as 
Ibn ʿAdī’s possible supporter on the topic of the “form of fire” (ṣūrat al-nār) (s. GERHARD ENDRESS, Ibn al-
Ḫammār, in: U. RUDOLPH, Philosophie in der islamischen Welt, Bd 1, 8.-10. Jahrhundert (Basel 2012), p. 33). 
54 KHALIL GEORR, Les Categories d‘Aristote dans leurs versions syro-arabes (Beirut 1948), p. 373-377 (hereafter 
called Ibn Suwār, In Cat.). For the very convincing hypothesis which identifies this treatise with that mentioned in 
margine s. ENDRESS, The Works, p. 49. 
55 Ibn Suwār, In Cat., p. 373. 
56 Ibid., p. 374 
12 
 
and Moderns (aḥad min al-mutaʾaḫḫirīn).57 By contrast, Ibn Suwār quotes Ammonius, Porphyry 
and Simplicius in support of his own opinion. However, the most important authority remains 
Aristotle. It is he whom Ibn ʿAdī contradicts. Ibn Suwār draws on what is known to him as 
Aristotle’s definition of substance and accident. Following the Porphyrian tradition he stresses 
the fact that “being in-a-subject” excludes being in-a-subject as its part. If substances are not-“in-
a-subject” – Ibn Suwār claims – following the logical rule of negation, we have to define 
substance as "that which is not-in-a-subject unless it is its part… (laysa bi-mawǧud fi-šayʾ illā 
ka-ǧuzʾ minhu…).”58 A little later, Ibn Suwār supports these considerations with quotes from 
Porphyry and Simplicius that have already been discussed above.59 On these grounds he agrees 
with Simplicius’ conclusion that everything that is a part of substance, including the so-called 
“constituents” (muqawwimāt), is substance. The very last argument is traditional – directing his 
reader to Cat. 3a29: “The parts of substances are substances (aǧzāʾ al-ǧawāhir ǧawāhir).” 60 
Thus, Ibn Suwār insists on remaining true to the Porphyrian approach to substantiality 
and accidentality. The main criterion is – as it was in the Commentators’ tradition – whether 
something is substantial or accidental. However, since that time Ibn ʿAdī created a new way of 
thinking – that substance has to be substance always, i.e. it cannot ever be in-a-subject or 
accidental. Moreover, Ibn ʿAdī relied in this argument on the authority of Aristotle who 
explicitly claimed that both primary and secondary substances have to be “not in-any-subject” at 
all (Arabic: al-battata fī mawḍūʿ mā; Greek: ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ οὐδενί).” In order to solve this 
difficulty Ibn Suwār appeals to a linguistic analysis of the Arabic expression “huwa l-laḏī laysa 
l-battata fī mawḍūʿ mā”. He claims that the Arabic “mā” in the definition of substance does not 
mean “any subject” but rather “this particular subject” (mušār ilayhi wa-l-wāḥid bi-l-ʿadad or 
later al-mawḍūʿ al-fulānī).61 From the grammatical point of view, Ibn Suwār is right and both 
readings are possible. However, if we address ourselves to the Greek original, the Aristotelian 
“ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ οὐδενί“ is unambiguous. It is Ibn ʿAdī who has the correct understanding of 
the Aristotelian text and not Ibn Suwār. We can conclude that Ibn Suwār – being even more 
remote from the Greek original then Ibn ʿAdī was62 – misinterpreted of the Aristotelian text. On 
the grounds of this misinterpretation, he concludes that Ibn ʿAdī’s approach to discerning the 
nature of substance and accident is wrong. Ibn Suwār is able to claim that one and the same thing 
can be one time substance and one time accident – as heat in fire and heat in iron. 
The dispute “on fire and heat” among the two representatives of the Baghdad Peripatetic 
School provides two principal issues. Firstly, none of them questioned the Porphyrian approach 
that, from accidentality, inferred being-an-accident, and from substantiality, inferred being-a-
                                                             
57 Ibn ʿAdī regards these kind of arguments as dialectic (al-ǧadaliyya) although he also agrees to play according to 
these rules and tries to show that Aristotle is on his side (Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī, On Fire and Heat, fol. 18v, §17). 
58 Ibn Suwār, In Cat., 374. 
59 Ibid., p. 376-377. 
60 Ibid., p. 377. 
61 Ibid., p. 376-377. Ibn Suwār ascribes the same view to Ammonius. Moreover, he presents this linguistic 
interpretation as a quote from Ammonius. However, the source of this quote hasn’t been identified. Anyway, it is 
hardly possible that Ammonius could have interpreted the Greek “ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ οὐδενί“ in the same way as Ibn 
Suwār did the Arabic “fī mawḍūʿ mā”. For the Greek does not allow for two interpretations in the same way as the 
Arabic does. 
62 Ibn ʿAdī’s correct understanding of the definition can be explained through his knowledge of Syriac. For the 
Syriac translation of “ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ οὐδενί“ as “ba-medem dēn da-sīm” (GEORR, Les Categories, p. 254, 6) does 
not leave any room for Ibn Suwār’s interpretation either since medem always means “any” or “none” as in this 
context. Another Syriac translation puts it differently but agrees with Ibn ʿAdī’s interpretation (s. DANIEL KING, The 
Earliest Syriac Translation of Aristotle’s Categories (Leiden-Boston, 2010), p. 96, 23-24). 
13 
 
substance. However, Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī claimed that substances have to remain substance always, 
i.e. they cannot ever be in-a-subject. This pushed him to the conclusion that one and the same 
thing cannot at one time be an accident and at another a substance; for being one or the other is 
something essential to them. Opposed to this, his disciple Ibn Suwār remained true to the Late 
Antique tradition in all respects. For him, the substantiality and accidentality of a thing only 
depends on its current circumstances. That’s why one and the same thing can be at one time a  
substance – if it is a “complement” of some other substance – and at another an  accident – if it is 
accidental for that substance. 
It is hard to say what the fate of this dispute was in the Baghdad School after Ibn Suwār’s 
treatise against Ibn ʿAdī. We cannot find this question explicitly discussed in the writings of the 
next generation. However, there is a sign that Ibn Suwār’s opinion won out. Abū l-Faraǧ Ibn al-
Ṭayyib – Ibn Suwār’s disciple – apparently follows the traditional way of approaching 
substantiality and accidentality in his commentary on Categories. He does not show any 
knowledge of Ibn ʿAdī’s arguments and his position is compatible with those of Ibn Suwār and 
the Commentators. He claims that “differentiae of substances are both substances and accidents 
– they are accidents in relation (bi-l-qiyās ilā) to the genus because they are inherent in it (daḫīla 
ʿalayhi), and they are substance in relation to the species because they constitute it (kāna minhā 
tuqawwamu).”63 This position corresponds to Ibn Suwār’s opinion that a thing’s substantiality 
and accidentality is ambivalent. Ibn ʿAdī’s theory of substance and accident was lost for the 
Baghdad Peripatetic School. However, it was rapidly picked up by Avicenna in order to turn it 
against the Baghdad School itself. 
 
Avicenna on the definition of substance and accident 
 
Having looked at the approaches to the notions of substancehood and substantiality in Late 
Antiquity and the Baghdad Peripatetic School, we now turn to Avicenna and his reformist 
reaction against the previous tradition. As was noted at the beginning, one finds a discussion 
about the proper definition of substance and accident in al-Šifāʾ, al-Nafs I, 1. It immediately 
appears to be related to the discussion about the ontological status of the parts of substance. 
Avicenna remarks at the end of his brief analysis of this problem in al-Nafs that he discussed it 
in his “Logic” at length. Apart from this, Avicenna also touches upon the same problem in 
Ilāhiyyāt II, 1 – although the discussion there is very short – and it too closes with a reference to 
the “Logic”.64 In both cases Avicenna apparently means Kitāb al-Šifāʾ, al-Maqūlāt I, 3-6 and 
especially chapter I, 6 “On the falsehood of the saying that one thing can be both accident and 
substance from two [different] perspectives”. 
One of the main goals of Avicenna’s investigation of the definition of substance and 
accident in Maqūlāt I, 3-6 is a differentiation between accidental/substantial and 
accident/substance. This is supplied by a strong emphasis on the essential character of being 
substance or accident. As it becomes clear even from the title of Maqūlāt I, 6, the position that he 
wishes to refute is that something can at one time be an accident and at another time a substance 
(or even at the same time from different perspectives). This targeted position is identical with 
that of Ibn Suwār and Ibn al-Ṭayyib. 
                                                             
63 Abū l-Faraǧ b. al-Ṭayyib, Tafsīr Kitāb al-Maqūlāt, ed. C. FERRARI, Der Kategorienkommentar von Abū l-Faraǧ 
ʿAbdallāh Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib (Leiden-Boston 2006), p. 159, 21-23. 
64 Avicenna, Kitāb al-Šifāʾ, al-Ilāhiyyāt, ed. G. QANAWATĪ and S. ZĀYID (Cairo 1960), II, 1, p. 48, 15. 
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Avicenna first introduces the position that he is going to refute. It has three arguments in 
favor of the claim that one and the same thing can be both accident and substance:  
(1) His opponent supposes that differentiae are substances (fuṣūl al-ǧawāhir ǧawahir) and at 
the same time they are qualities (al-kayfiyyāt), i.e. a kind of accident (ʿaraḍ). On these 
grounds he draws the conclusion that one and the same thing can be both substance and 
accident (ka-inna al-šayʾ yakūnu ʿaraḍan wa-ǧawharan).65  
(2) The second argument touches upon the status of form in matter. Form is in a material 
bearer (ḥāmil) not as its part. It is consequently an accident of matter. However, it is at 
the same time a part of the composite substance (al-ǧawhar al-murakkab i.e. the 
substance composed of form and matter). So, it is also substance because a part of 
substance is a substance (ǧuzʾ al-ǧawhar ǧawhar).66 
(3) The third argument deals with the difference between whiteness (bayāḍ) and white 
(abyaḍ), the second being a composite of substance and whiteness (maǧmūʿ ǧawhar wa-
bayāḍ). This composite is itself substance. Since whiteness is a part of white which is 
substance, it is substance itself. However, the same (bi-ʿaynihī) whiteness is known to be 
in some subject (like Socrates) not as its part. So, it is accident in relation to its subject 
and substance in relation to the composite “white”.67 
A little later Avicenna explains the general methodological approach of his opponents: They 
distinguish substance according to three conditions: (a) it is in-a-subject as its part; (b) 
everything that is in-a-subject as its part is not an accident and (c) everything that is not an 
accident has to be substance.68 
 It is beyond any doubt that Avicenna’s dialectical opponents represent the view of the 
Late Antique tradition welcomed by the Baghdad Peripatetics. In Ilāhiyyāt II, 1, Avicenna makes 
it clear that his discussion of the ontological status of the parts of substance depends on his 
knowledge of the same discussion in the Baghdad Peripatetic School:  
 
 Moreover, many who claim to have knowledge have allowed that something can be both a 
substance and an accident with respect (bi-l-qiyās ilā) to two things. Thus, [one of these 
people] would say: "Heat is an accident in something other than the body of fire, but in fire 
[as such] it is not an accident because it exists in it as a part. Moreover, it is not possible to 
remove [heat] from fire with the fire remaining [a fire]. Hence, its existence in fire is not 
that of the existence of an accident inhering in it. And if its existence in [the fire] is not the 
existence of an accident, then [the existence of heat] in [the fire] is the existence of a 
substance.69 
  
It is not absolutely clear who in particular is being attacked and what treatises he had read on this 
problem. There is no doubt that Avicenna knew Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī’s position on the topic – since his 
own will be built on it. Moreover, in “On Fire and Heat” we have already seen the argument 
mentioned at Ilāhiyyāt II, 1 that heat is a substance in fire because it cannot be removed from it. 
Argument (2) stands close to the argumentation of Ibn Suwār and Avicenna pays much attention 
                                                             
65 Idem, Kitāb al-Šifāʾ, al-Manṭiq, al-Maqūlāt, ed. G. QANAWATĪ, M. AL-ḪUDAIRĪ, A. AL-AHWĀNĪ and S. ZĀYID 
(Cairo 1959), I, 6, pp. 45, 16 – 46, 1. 
66 Ibid., p. 46, 2-3. 
67 Ibid., p. 46, 4-7. 
68 Ibid., p. 48, 1-3. 
69 Avicenna, The Metaphysics of Healing, tr. M. MARMURA (Provo 2005), p. 46, 20-28. 
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to proving that form’s being in matter is not being in-a-subject.70 Argument (1) rather reminds 
one of the Late Antique considerations about substantial qualities: they are substantial and 
therefore substances according to Porphyry’s rule but are still also qualities.71 Avicenna’s 
expression of the relativity of substancehood “bi-l-qiyās ilā” immediately reminds us of the same 
expression in Ibn al-Ṭayyib’s commentary on Categories. We can thus conclude that Avicenna’s 
discussion about the parts of substance was rooted in the Baghdad Peripatetic context, so that he 
directly or indirectly knew the main positions and arguments – and most importantly that of Ibn 
ʿAdī. So much for Avicenna’s opponents; let us turn now to his own position. 
 Avicenna begins by defining both substance and accident. The reality of the essence 
(ḥaqīqat ḏātihī) of substance does not exist in-a-subject at all (lā fī mawḍūʿ al-battata), being not 
its part in such a way that it would not be able to exist being separated (mufāriqatuhū). Accident, 
on the contrary, inevitably is in something so that its quiddity (māhiyyatuhū) does not come into 
existence (lā taḥṣulu mawǧūda) unless there is a thing in which it inheres.72 We can easily see 
that Avicenna lays a strong emphasis on the notions of essence and quiddity of a thing while he 
defines substance and accident. It is these terms that allow him to make the main observation of 
his argumentation: 
  
 Since it is impossible that the quiddity of one and the same thing would need (muftaqira) to 
be in something as in-a-subject in order to exist and at the same time (maʿa ḏālika) it 
would not need (ġayr muḥtāǧa) at all (al-battata) to be in something as in-a-subject, there 
is nothing that is [both] substance and accident.73 
 
Avicenna claims that something cannot be both accident and substance in different 
circumstances or under different relations because to be in need of any subject in order to exist or 
not is something that depends on its essence or quiddity and cannot vary. How do we know if 
something has this need or not? Avicenna gives an answer to this question while dealing with the 
arguments of his opponents. The thing does not need to be in-a-subject if it is never in the subject 
(laysat fī šayʾ min ašyāʾ kamma yakūnu al-ʿaraḍ fī l-mawḍūʿ) – i.e. it is never an accident (lam 
yakun ʿaraḍan al-battata).74 Avicenna understands the “al-battata” from the definition of 
substance as “never”.75 If something is indeed never in-a-subject it can be acknowledged to be 
substance – i.e. to be not-in-a-subject in itself (fī nafsihī).76 
 Relying on these premises Avicenna solves the problem of the parts of substance. It is 
wrong to think that a thing’s “being in-a-subject as its part” automatically renders it substance. It 
                                                             
70 Maqūlāt I, 3. This issue deserves a separate study. To summarize: form is in matter not as an accident in-a-subject 
because matter needs form in order to exist. It was very much discussed by Alexander (Quaestio I, 8; I, 16, I, 26, on 
them s. RASHED, Essentialisme, p. 44ff). 
71 Dexippus, In Aristotelis categorias commentarium, ed. A. BUSSE, Dexippi in Aristotelis categorias 
commentarium, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 4.2. (Berlin 1888), p. 49, 10ff – where the Porphyrian doctrine 
is reported – is the closest passage to this argument. Avicenna’s reference to the fact that ‘differentiae are 
substances’ was  something known from the antique tradition (this is what the expression samiʿu (Maqūlāt I, 6, 46, 
16) implies) could be a sign that he knew somebody from the Ammonian tradition that had claimed this. 
72 Maqūlāt, I, 6, p. 46, 8-13. 
73 Ibid., p. 46, 16-19. 
74 Ibid., p. 47, 8-13. 
75 Note the difference to Ibn ʿAdī’s linguistic analysis of the definition of substance. He thinks that “mā” in 
“mawḍūʿ mā” means “any” and on these grounds concludes that substance cannot be in any subject. On the contrary, 
Avicenna does not have the particle “mā” in his definition of substance and derives the same meaning of “never” as 
by Ibn ʿAdī from the expression “al-battata” that can be both interpreted as “never” and “not in any respect”. 
76 The expression substance in itself or accident in itself is used e.g. in Maqūlāt, I, 6, p. 48, 6, 13 etc. 
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is still possible that it is a part of a composite (murakkab) where it can be an accident.77 How 
should we know then whether it is substance or not? We should investigate if it is ever in-a-
subject. If not, it can be concluded that it is substance. If yes, it has to be admitted that this thing 
is accident – even if it is a part of its subject in this case and in thousand other cases.78 Thus, a 
differentia is recognized to be substance not because it is a part of some of its concrete subjects, 
but rather because it is never in-a-subject and always a part of it. As for the relation between 
differentiae and genus, it is like that of form and matter – i.e. not as accident in-a-subject.79 
 In the analysis and argumentation described so far Avicenna apparently follows Yaḥyā b. 
ʿAdī. Both of them refuse to conclude that something is substance only on the grounds that it is 
in-a-subject yet as its part. Something has to be always not-in-a-subject in order to be labeled as 
substance. Being a substance or an accident is something dependent on a thing’s essence and is 
not relational. Being both a substance and an accident – either in one and the same case in 
relation to different circumstances, or at different times – is excluded by both authors. However, 
Avicenna does not only accept Ibn ʿAdī’s method to recognize substances. He goes further so 
that an important difference arises between the two philosophers in their theories of 
substantiality and accidentality. 
 It was established earlier that Ibn ʿAdī does not consider composites (murakkabāt) as 
substances. On these grounds he escaped from being forced to refute the whole Porphyrian 
method of distinguishing substance and accident. Ibn ʿAdī also maintained that there cannot be 
“substantial accidents” and “accidental substances”. However, we have seen that this could force 
him to the conclusion that nothing is a substance except prime matter (everything else being 
accidental for it). In order to escape this problem, the later Baghdad tradition rejected Ibn ʿAdī’s 
idea that an accident is always an accident. Their system allowed “substantial accidents” and 
“accidental substances” meaning by this “substantial to one subject and accidental to another”. 
Now, Avicenna takes Ibn ʿAdī’s path and assumes that accident is always accident, since it is its 
essential characteristic. How then does he escape the problem that everything would be an 
accident according to this theory? In order to do this, Avicenna refutes the whole approach of the 
preceding tradition – both Ibn ʿAdī and his opponents. He claims that being 
substantial/accidental and being substance/accident are not the same. 
 Avicenna establishes that ‘being a substance’ (ǧawhariyya) or ‘being an accident’ 
(ʿaraḍiyya) is not something relational (li-anna l-šayʾ bi-l-qiyās ilā šayʾ…), but rather they occur 
to a thing because of “itself” (li-annahū fī nafsihī ka-ḏālika).80 Thus, something is an accident if 
it is in-a-subject and needs this or some other subject in order to exist. Its coming into existence 
happened through the existence of its subject (ḏātuhū qad ḥaṣala mawǧūdan fī mawḍūʿ li-
                                                             
77 Avicenna already provides this argument in Maqūlāt I, 4, p. 34, 5-8 and 17-18. His position there seems to relay 
once again on Ibn ʿAdī. For Avicenna agrees that one should differentiate between the subject of accident and the 
composite. Being in a composite is not like being in-a-subject. A composite (murakkab) consists of a substance and 
an accident. The accident exists in the composite as its part while being in the substance as an accident. This is 
indeed how Ibn ʿAdī’s theory works as was established above. 
78 This is a summary of the argument presented in Ibid., p. 48, 5 – 49, 12. Though such parts of substances are 
substances in Avicenna one should not consider them as independent parts cf. FEDOR BENEVICH, Die göttliche 
Existenz: Zum ontologischen Status der Essenz qua Essenz bei Avicenna, Documenti e studi sulla tradizione 
metaphysica medievale XXVI (2015), p. 121. 
79 This argument is further evidence for Avicenna’s criticisms being directed at Ibn al-Ṭayyib. The latter wrote in his 
commentary on Categories that differentiae are in some respect accidents because they inhere in genus as in-a-
subject. This is what Avicenna tries to escape here. 
80 Maqūlāt I, 6 p. 49, 13-15. 
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ānnahū mawǧūd fī hāḏā l-mawḍūʿ). It is an accidental accident (ʿaradī wa ʿaraḍ) if it 
additionally is not a constituent (muqawwim) of its subject, i.e. it is not its subject’s part.81 The 
same works for substantial (ǧawharī). It only means that something is a part of an underlying 
subject, i.e. it is a constituent of it. However, something’ being substantial does not render it a 
substance. For being a substance means “being in its ‘self’ in no need at all of a subject” (fī 
nafsihī ġayr muftaqir ilā mawdūʿ al-battata). Being a substance is something non-relational 
whereas being substantial is relational.82 
 Thus, being substantial has a meaning different from being a substance and likewise 
being accidental is different from being an accident.83 Being substantial or accidental depends on 
a thing’s current relation to its surroundings. It means that something is either added to a 
substance or is its integral part.84 By contrast, being a substance or an accident is non-relative 
and essential for a thing. It is its essence, i.e. the thing itself apart from its surroundings, that 
reveals whether the thing needs a bearer to come into existence or not. As for the notions of 
substantial and accidental they express whether the thing is added or not. Being a substance or an 
accident expresses an existential (in)dependence, i.e. does something need something else to 
come into existence or not – despite not being connected causally to it. Avicenna claims that the 
latter is an absolutely different story from the former. Our knowledge whether something is 
added to something or is its integral part does not reveal whether it is existentially independent 
or not.  
 Avicenna distinguishes between existential independence and cognitive separability. 
There is no difference between substance and accident at all on the level of epistemic analysis (fī 
l-wahm): both substance and accident can be conceptually separated from each other.85 However, 
on the level of extra-mental reality, a substance is independent whereas an accident cannot 
continue to exist being separated from it (lā yumkinu mufāriqatuhū li-mā huwa fīhi).86 On the 
grounds of this approach Avicenna creates a further – this time methodological – difference 
between substantial/accidental and substancehood/accidenthood. In the former case, it is 
conceptual analysis that provides us with information about whether something is substantial or 
accidental. If S can be separated conceptually from P, then P is accidental for it, as “black” can 
be conceptually removed from Ethiopian.87 On the contrary, if we cannot mentally entertain S 
                                                             
81 Ibid., p. 49, 20 – 50, 4. 
82 Cf. Ibid., p. 50, 12 – 51, 4-5: “al-šayʾ laysa ǧawharan bi-l-qiyās ilā šayʾ wa-in kāna ǧawhariyyan bi-l-qiyās ilā 
šayʾ al-laḏī huwa fīhi.” 
83 Avicenna expresses the same idea already in Maqūlāt I, 3 p. 26, 5-8 although he hasn’t proven it there yet. 
Previously he says that his opponents have confused being substantial and being substance while speaking about the 
notions of “maqūl ʿalā l-mawḍūʿ” and “maqūl fī l-mawḍūʿ” (Maqūlāt I, 3, 23, 4-6). According to Avicenna they 
claimed that only complements of substance (muqawwimāt) can be said “maqūl ʿalā l-mawḍūʿ” whereas accidents 
cannot. For accidents are all accidental and cannot be predicated of their subject as universals. To the contrary, 
Avicenna argues that accidents can also be called “maqūl ʿalā l-mawḍūʿ” when we speak about universal accidents 
(like universal “white”). However, it seems that Avicenna is rather unfair in this accusation. For e.g. Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī, 
who obviously recognizes the identity of accidental and accidents, also speaks of universal accidents in his On Fire 
and Heat, fol. 18v, §22. What Avicenna probably implies is that if substantial (which is extensionally equal to 
“maqūl ʿalā l-mawḍū”) means substance, then the Porphyrians have problems with substantial attributes of accidents 
(like “color” for “white”). 
84 Accordingly Avicenna has three types of accidental: accidents par excellence, necessary concomitants (lawāzim) 
and essentially necessary concomitants (alias “essential accidents”, al-aʿrād al-ḏātīya), cf. Avicenna, Kitāb al-Šifāʾ, 
al-Manṭiq, al-Madḫal, ed. G. QANAWATĪ, M. AL-ḪUDAIRĪ and A. AL-AHWĀNĪ (Cairo 1952), p. 32. 
85 Maqūlāt I, 4, p. 37, 5-6 
86 Ibid., p. 32, 18. 
87 Avicenna, Madḫal I, 5, p. 32, 10. Example is Avicennas. 
18 
 
without ascribing P to it, P is essential for it, as “figure” and “triangle”.88 However, in the 
analysis of existential dependence, epistemic analysis is claimed by Avicenna to be misleading. 
It does not matter whether one can conceive of an accident without its subject or not. Instead 
Avicenna suggests observing whether some P comes in a concrete case (muʿayyan) into 
existence only while some S underlies it. This means that the cause of the actual subsistence of P 
(not of its essence!) lies in S (ʿilla qiwāmihī hiya annahū fīhi).89 Although Avicennas says that 
one can conceive of Ethiopian with the attribute “black” and “black” without Ethiopian, black 
depends in its existence on Ethiopian when it comes to be in him. Hence the analysis levels of 
substantiality and substancehood are different ones. The one involves conceptual analysis in 
order to draw conclusions about the essential or non-essential character of an attribute. It builds 
the structures of essential dependence among the things. However, the other 
(substancehood/accidenthood) does not investigate what is essential and what is not. It reveals a 
different kind of ontological relation: something can come into existence only while something 
underlying exists. Although the essence of “blackness” does not anyhow depend on its subjects it 
needs them in order to come into existence. This latter is to be called “existential dependence”.90 
 Thus, in order to establish whether the thing under investigation is substance or accident 
we have to prove whether it is per se existentially independent. This is ascertained by 
discovering whether it is existentially independent in all possible cases. If it is existentially 
independent in every case known to us – i.e. it continues to exist even if its subject is removed – 
then it is independent per se and subsequently is a substance.91 If it is found at least in one case 
to be dependent then it is an accident in itself. This was also Ibn ʿAdī’s conclusion. However, 
now Avicenna differentiates between accidental and accident. This is precisely what allows him 
to escape Ibn ʿAdī’s dilemma, which entailed that all things are accidents because they are 
accidental, i.e. additional, to prime matter. The same worked for differentiae, which are similarly 
added to their genera. Avicenna disagrees; differentiae are not dependent on the genus or the 
forms on matter. For genus is also dependent on differentiae and matter on forms.92 Avicenna 
apparently thinks that mutual dependence rules out the sort of dependence involved in “being in-
a-subject”. Since he has also drawn a distinction between accidental and accident, the conclusion 
follows: differentiae are accidental to genera but they are not accidents in it. Only if it happens 
for them to be once an accidental accident, are they accidents in their genera. Otherwise they are 
substances.93 The same works for matter and forms. Although forms are accidental to matter – 
for they are obviously additional to it – they are not in matter as in-a-subject and accordingly 
they are not accidents but substances. 
                                                             
88Ibid., I, 6, 34-35. By conceptual inseparability I mean here that conceiving of P is a necessary condition for 
conceiving of S. Otherwise, some immediate concomitants would be conceptually inseparable two as Avicenna 
states while denying that they are necessary conditions for conceiving of essences. For the synonymy of “essential” 
and “substantial” see infra. 
89 Maqūlāt I, 4, p. 32, 17 – 33, 9. 
90 Cf. the idea of dependence of accidents on substances in MARWAN RASHED, Al-Ḥasan Ibn Mūsā al-Nabawaḫtī: 
Commentary on Aristotle “De Generatione et Corruptione” (Berlin 2015), pp. 108-14. 
91 Going back to the starting point of this article - this is how Avicenna establishes that soul is a substance in Nafs I, 
3. Note that both Avicenna and Ibn ʿAdī disregard the problems of induction. If a scientist decides that he knows all 
the cases and in all these cases something is not-in-a-subject he is able to conclude that it is a substance. It is always 
possible, though, that some particular case where it is in-a-subject escapes the scientist’s attention. 
92 Maqūlāt I, 6, p. 47, 8-13. 
93 This only applies to the differentiae that Avicenna calls “derivative” or “simple” like “rationality” (nuṭq) as 
opposed to “univocal” and “composite” differentiae like “rational” (nātiq). Whether the latter are substances or not 
is dependent on their bearers. On this see SILVIA DI VINCENZO, Avicenna against Porphyry’s Definition of 
Differentia Specifica, Documenti e studi sulla tradizione metaphysica medievale XXVI (2015), pp. 162-3. 
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Avicenna thus is committed to the view that there should be some substantial accidents 
and accidental substances. For instance, if fire is substance while being composed of some 
substance and the accident “heat”, then there are some substantial accidents. But are all the 
composed things (murakkabāt) substances in Avicenna? Rather not.94 Nevertheless it would 
suffice that composites according to Avicenna have some quiddity (māhiyya) or essence (ḏāt).95 
For Avicenna states that “substantial” means the same as “essential” – i.e. being an integral part 
of an essence.96 Since being substantial or essential means nothing more than being integral or 
being added to something that has an essence, it follows that there are some substantial 
accidents. Namely, those accidents which are integral to the essences of the composites are 
indeed substantial accidents. What about accidental substances? Avicenna’s strict distinction 
between accidental and accident is problematic in many respects because accidentality (like 
additionality) implies more or less the same meaning of ontological dependence as being an 
accident.97 It is consequently hard to find any accidental substances – cases when something is 
“added” yet is independent. Nevertheless, Avicenna explicitly states that there are accidental 
substances in Naǧāt98 and in Ilāhiyyāt III, 399. In both cases Avicenna resorts to the help of a 
rather artificial example that was also mentioned in the third argument of his opponents. 
Whiteness (bayāḍ) is an accident and is accidental. However, “white” (abyaḍ) – which means 
“that which possesses whiteness”100 – is substance yet also accidental for e.g. Zayd. The “white” 
is a kind of composite substance being composed of substance (Zayd?) and the accident 
“whiteness” while this substance is something accidental to Zayd. This theory is rather obscure. 
Avicenna probably means that “Zayd is being white” makes “the white” an ostensible substance, 
as when we say “This white [thing] which is Zayd”. Thereby Avicenna explicitly accepts 
accidental substances. “This white thing” is an ontologically independent subject being an 
accidental state of “Zayd”. Nevertheless Avicenna himself accepts that “accidental” and 
“accidenthood” are necessary concomitants of each other although they do not denote the same 
thing (wa-hāḏāni l-maʿnayāni wa-in talāzamā).101 It is also clear why: the accidental substance 
“the white” is a composite of “whiteness” and “substance” and it always involves an accidental 
accident “whiteness” as its part. Again, although “the white” and “whiteness” are necessary 
concomitants they are different ontological entities with different characteristics: “the white” is 
an accidental substance whereas “whiteness” is an accidental accident. Does this mean that 
“accidental” and “accident” are only intensionally different, whereas extensionally the same? 
                                                             
94 One should distinguish between two kinds of composites: C is composed of S and P where (1) S is matter (or like 
matter) and P is form (or like form). These composites are substances and their parts are substances (cf. Ilāhiyyāt V, 
3, p. 214, 15); (2) S is substance and P is an accident like chair made of wood and a particular form or snubnose 
consisting of nose and concavity. Avicennas explicitly says that these are not like matter and form. Such composites 
are not substances (Maqūlāt I, 4, p. 34, 17-20). 
95 Ilāhiyyāt V, 8, p. 244-245. Here concavity and nose are mentioned again.  
96 Maqūlāt, I, 6, p. 50, 15: fa-yakūnu l-ǧawharī makān al-ḏātī. The definition of „essential“ as “integral part of 
essence” corresponds to Avicenna’s definition of essential in Madḫal I, 5-6. However this is not the only 
understanding of “essential” in Avicenna. Apart from it there is also: Burhān definition of essential found in 
Avicenna, Kitāb al-Šifāʾ, al-Manṭiq, al-Burhān, ed. A. ʿAFĪFĪ (Cairo 1952), II, 2, p. 125-127; “primacy” definition of 
essential found in Burhān II, 2, p. 128 and e.g. in Avicenna, Al-Išārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt maʿa šarḥ Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, 
ed. S. DUNYA, vol. 1 (Cairo 1957), p. 170, 5 – 173, 3. 
97 The very notion of “addition” implies the meaning of being dependent. This was apparently one of the reasons 
why the Porphyrian tradition started to define accident through its accidental character. The other reason should 
have been Aristotle himself (s. BARNES, Porphyry, p. 220-224). 
98 Avicenna, Kitāb al-Naǧāt min al-ġarq fī baḥr al-dalālāt, ed. M. DĀNIŠPAŽŪH (Tehran 1985), p. 12, 9-10. 
99 Ilāhiyyāt III, 3, 106, 15-17. 
100 Avicenna explains what “white” means in Maqūlāt I, 15, p. 41, 15 and II, 58, 3ff.  
101 Ibid., p. 50, 6-7. 
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Avicenna’s position on this is not clear enough here. In the case of whiteness it is the case. 
However, “accidental” could also include such cases as two bound substances like soul and 
body. They are “additional”, i.e. accidental to each other, but neither of them involves an 
accident. In this case we have two accidental substances but no accidents, so that the 
“accidental” and “accident” are also extensionally different. 
To sum up: how can we decide whether some “B” which is predicated of “A” designates 
a substance or an accident according to Avicenna? First, we have to decide whether B is 
substantial or accidental to A, i.e. extrinsic or intrinsic. In order to do this, we check whether “A” 
can be conceived of without having “B”. If so, then we still have to check, whether “B” 
existentially depends on “A” or just accompanies it. If it is dependent on “A”, then “B” is an 
accidental accident. If “B” is independent though additional it is an accidental substance. On the 
other hand, if “B” appears to be required for “A” the procedure is different. We have to check 
whether in any among the observed cases “B” appeared to be an accidental accident. If not, but 
has always been either an accidental substance or something substantial we can conclude that it 
is a substantial substance in this case. If, however, it has been an accidental accident at least 
once, then it is a substantial accident in this case. One could wonder, why not just check whether 
“B” depends on “A” as we did in the case when it was accidental (not required for “A”). 
Avicenna never clarifies this point, but we could suggest that, if “B” is substantial for “A” it will 
always seem that it depends on “A” – is it a substance or accident in itself. In order to escape this 
mistake – because this kind of dependence is something different from what Avicenna wants 
with “accident” – Avicenna suggest a different methodological route. 
The most important theoretical consequence of this procedure is the differentiation 
between two kinds of metaphysical relation that two things may have to each other. (1) One is 
“being additional” or “being integral”. It corresponds to what we nowadays would call “essential 
grounding”. For it signifies the fact that an essence is grounded by its constituents (like 
“rationality” and “man”) and not grounded by the extrinsic attributes. This relation is checked by 
the test whether the conceptual negation of the predicate removes the subject. (2) As for “being 
dependent” or “independent”, it can be labeled as “existential grounding”; for it signifies that an 
attribute P is dependent in its existence on S – irrespective of whether P is essentially connected 
to S or not. The existential grounding relation is checked by statistical analysis: whether P’s 
existence has ever been found dependent on the existence of an S. 
 Before we conclude, one remaining difficulty has to be solved. In Maqūlāt II, 1-2 
Avicenna, following the Peripatetic tradition, tries to establish that neither “being” (mawǧūd) is a 
genus for all the categories, nor is “accident” (ʿaraḍ) a genus for the nine categories. In both 
cases his argumentation works in the same manner: he clarifies that neither “being” nor 
“accident” are constituents (muqawwim) of categories whereas genus has to be a constituent. 
Avicenna first shows that “being” is not the genus of categories – even if we agreed that it is 
used in them univocally (bi-l-tawāṭuʿ).102 He proves it on the ground of his famous essence-
existence distinction: if we imagine the quiddity of a triangle this does not entail that we imagine 
it being existent – whereas it does entail imagining it as a “figure” (lasta taḥtāǧu fī taṣawwurika 
māhiyyat al-muṯallaṯ an tataṣawwira annahū mawǧūd ka-mā taḫtāǧu an tataṣawwira annahū 
                                                             
102 Avicenna himself follows the Periptatetic tradition accepting that being is said of categories by analogy (bi-l-
taškīk). On this s. ALEXANDER TREIGER, Avicenna’s Notion of Transcendental Modulation of Existence (taškīk al-
wuǧūd, analogia entis) and Its Greek and Arabic Sources, in: F. OPWIS and D. RESIMAN, Islamic Philosophy, 
Science, Culture, and Religion: Studies in Honor of Dimitri Gutas (Leiden-Boston 2012), pp. 327-365. 
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šakl). Thus, existence is not a constituent of a triangle’s quiddity (fa mā kāna miṯla l-wuǧūd fa-
laysa muqawwiman li-l-māhiyyatihī). “Being” is not something denoting an entity integral in the 
quiddity of a thing (fa-innahū ġayr dāll ʿalā maʿnā dāḫil fī māhiyyāt al-ašyāʾ). So, it cannot be 
its genus.103 
 The same works for “accident” in relation to the nine categories. It does not denote the 
natures (ṭabāʾiʿ) of these categories but rather a relation to what they inhere in (al-nisba ilā mā 
huwa fīhi). Avicenna explicitly states that being an accident is something accidental “ʿaraḍī” for 
the nine categories so that it is not constituent of their quiddities (amr ġayr muqawwim li-
māhiyyātihā). Parallel to his proof that the existence of triangle is not obvious for us from the 
very notion of triangle, Avicenna says that neither is being accident obvious for the nine 
categories and had to be proven for each of them in the First Philosophy.104 So, “accident” is not 
a constituent and consequently not the genus of the nine categories.105 
 How can Avicenna assume that a thing is substance/accident in its essence (fī nafsihī or fī 
ḏātihī) if being an accident is something “accidental” for it? Can something be essential and 
accidental at the same time? Avicenna does not seem to see any inconsistency here but simply 
repeats that being in-a-subject is essential for accident, i.e. its essence entails it (ḏātahū 
taqtaḍī).106 However, this inconsistency can be solved if we investigate different meanings of 
“essential” in Avicenna as well as pay attention not only to what is parallel between the case of 
existence and accident but also to the differences between them. 
 The “essential” (ḏātī) can have several meanings in Avicenna. For us two of them are 
important now. First “essential” as it is used in Madḫal I, 5-6 where it means just “constituent” 
(muqawwim). It is in this respect that accident was called “accidental” – because it is not a 
constituent of essence. However, the essential necessity of accidenthood for accidents is 
understood in this article in a different way. Avicenna alludes to it when he defines both 
substantial and some accidental parts as: “that which occurs to the thing not through a cause 
external to it” (lā yakūnu lahū bi-ʿilla ḫāriga ʿan ḏātihī). Even something accidental can be 
labeled as essentially necessary in this sense of essential because the quiddity entails (muqtaḍiya) 
it.107 It is this sense of essential where existence and being an accident differ. The former is 
neither a constituent of a thing nor is it accidental yet essentially necessary. The latter is not a 
constituent either. However, it is essentially necessary because the very essence of a thing entails 
its being an accident. Hence Avicenna, speaking about the parallel between the relation of 
accident to the nine categories and that of being to quiddities, makes a restriction: “as regards not 
being integral to quiddity”.108 Thus, the parallel between the non-essentiality of existence and 
                                                             
103 Maqūlāt II, 1, p. 61, 2-14. In Išārāt, p. 155 he uses the same argument in order to establish that existence is not 
something essential for essence. 
104 By this he probably means proving the accidentality of numbers etc. s. STEPHEN MENN, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, 
in: P. ADAMSON, Interpreting Avicenna: Critical Essays (Cambridge 2013), p. 162. Menn rightly demarcates 
between the Isagoge (predicable) and Categories (predicamental) sense of “accident” which is crucial for the 
present article. 
105 Maqūlāt, II, 2, p. 65, 12 – 66,2. A good example could also be the parts of substance that are the topic of this 
paper. 
106 Ibid., II, 2, p. 65, 13: „wa ʿalā anna ḏātahū taqtaḍī hāḏihī l-nisba” and Ibid., 16-17: “ʿalā annahū fī ḏātihī bi-
ḥayṯ lā budda lahū min mawḍūʿ”. 
107 Ibid., II, 1, p. 61,17 – 62,1: “wa-in kāna qad yakūnu min al-ʿaraḍī mā ḫuṣūluhū laysa bi-ʿillat ḫariǧa ʿan al-
māhiyya bal takūnu l-māhiyya mūǧiba lahū wa-muqtaḍiya ayāhu.” This sense of essential is extensionally identical 
with the scientific essentiality of Burhān II, 2. 




being an accident is valid only in the framework of the first meaning of essentiality, i.e. where 
essential is identical to constituent. By contrast, as for the second meaning of essential, existence 
is not essential whereas “being accident”, i.e. “being in need of a subject when existing” is 
essential. 
 Thus, the difficulty is solved. Avicenna’s essentialist approach to defining the condition 
of being substance or accident remains valid.  It is the essence of a thing that entails its being 
substance or accident – irrespective of what surrounds it. Avicenna’s main insistence is that this 





Avicenna’s theory of substance and accident is mostly developed as a reaction to the previous 
tradition.109 As was shown in the first part of this article, the Aristotelian definition of substance 
and accident in Categories provided Avicenna’s predecessors with two features characteristic of 
accidents. The first was that accidents are in their subjects not as their parts. The second was that 
accidents are ontologically dependent on their subjects. The Late Antique tradition laid emphasis 
on the first aspect of being accident and that’s why they equated being an accident with being 
accidental (i.e. extrinsic to substance). On these grounds it emerged that everything that is 
substantial – i.e. integral for a substance – is substance itself. This tradition paired accidentality 
(additionality) with ontological dependence and substantiality (intrinsicality) with ontological 
independence.110 
 However, a problem emerged from this. If being substance/accident means being 
substantial/accidental then one and the same thing can at one time be substance and at another 
accident – or even at the same time in relation to different objects. This was the mainstream 
position in the Baghdad Peripatetic School in the 10th century – its traces can be found in Ibn 
Suwār and Abū l-Faraǧ Ibn al-Ṭayyib. However, Yaḥyā Ibn ʿAdī tried to refute it insisting that 
being substance or accident is something non-relational, i.e. essential for a thing. Nevertheless, 
Ibn ʿAdī remained faithful to the Late Antique tradition. His theory accepts that every substantial 
feature is substance whereas every accidental is accident although there are cases of composites 
(murakkabāt) when being a part entails neither substantiality nor being a substance. His theory 
was in danger of stating that everything apart from prime matter is a composite. 
 Avicenna followed Ibn ʿAdī in his idea that being substance/accident is essential for a 
thing. Relying on the observations of this article as well as on other well-known cases of Ibn 
                                                             
109 It is worth noticing that this conclusion applies first of all to Avicenna’s theory of substance as found in his Šifāʾ. 
On the contrary, we cannot find any traces of the discussion about fire and heat in his earlier work al-Muḫtaṣar al-
awsaṭ (s. ALEXANDER KALBARCZYK, The Kitāb al-Maqūlāt of the Muḫtaṣar al-awsaṭ fī l-manṭiq: A Hitherto 
Unknown Source for Studying Ibn Sīnā’s Reception of Aristotle’s Categories, Oriens 40 (2012), p. 329-332), 
although it was obviously Avicenna’s vorlage for several topics discussed in Maqūlāt. 
110 Thus: If X is substance and Y is accidental for it, removing Y does not harm X (= accidentality of Y), whereas 
removing of X eliminates Y (= ontological dependence of Y). Following this logic one can easily imagine the same 
procedure for substantial parts so that the following is valid: if X is substance and Y is substantial for it, removing of 
Y eliminates X (= substantiality of Y), whereas removing of X does not harm Y (= ontological independence of Y). 
It follows that substances are a kind of accidents for their substantial constituents and that these constituents are 
ontologically more independent that the substances. This is the conclusion that al-Fārābī derives from the 
Porphyrian approach to substantiality and accidentality (Al-Fārābī, Kitāb al-Ḥurūf, ed. M. MAHDI (Beirut 1969), p. 
103, 12 – 104, 5). 
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ʿAdī’s influence on Avicenna111 we can suggest that Ibn ʿAdī was after al-Fārābī one of the main 
Arabic sources for Avicenna. It is especially significant in the case investigated in this article 
since Avicenna made use of Ibn ʿAdī’s theory of essentiality of being substance in order to refute 
the position represented by other later Baghdad Peripatetics as Ibn Suwār and Ibn al-Ṭayyib. 
 
                                                             
111 S. e.g. MARWAN RASHED, Ibn ʿAdī et Avicenne and MENN, Avicenna’s Metaphysics, p. 154 – 157 on Ibn ʿAdī’s 
influence on Avicenna’s theory of universals. Exactly as in our case Avicenna takes Ibn ʿAdī’s ideas as a starting 
point and develops them in what becomes one of the main new ideas of his metaphysics. 
